Grey-box fuzzing is a random testing technique that has been shown to be effective at finding security vulnerabilities in software. The technique leverages program instrumentation to gather information about the program with the goal of increasing the code coverage during fuzzing, which makes gray-box fuzzers extremely efficient vulnerability detection tools. One such tool is AFL, a grey-box fuzzer for C programs that has been used successfully to find security vulnerabilities and other critical defects in countless software products. We present Kelinci, a tool that interfaces AFL with instrumented Java programs. The tool does not require modifications to AFL and is easily parallelizable. Applying AFL-type fuzzing to Java programs opens up the possibility of testing Java based applications using this powerful technique. We show the effectiveness of Kelinci by applying it on the image processing library Apache Commons Imaging, in which it identified a bug within one hour.
INTRODUCTION
Fuzz testing [6, 10] is an automated testing technique that is used to discover security vulnerabilities and other bugs in software. * This material is based on research sponsored by DARPA under agreement number FA8750-15-2-0087. The U.S. Government is authorized to reproduce and distribute reprints for Governmental purposes notwithstanding any copyright notation thereon. The views and conclusions contained herein are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies or endorsements, either expressed or implied, of DARPA or the U.S. Government.
Permission to make digital or hard copies of part or all of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. Copyrights for third-party components of this work must be honored. For all other uses, contact the owner/author(s). In its simplest, black-box, form, a program is run on randomly generated or mutated inputs, in search of cases where the program crashes or hangs. More advanced, white-box, fuzzing techniques leverage program analysis to systematically increase code coverage during fuzzing [2, 5, 9] . Grey-box fuzzers leverage program instrumentation rather than program analysis to gather information about the program paths exercised by the inputs to increase coverage. An extensive list of tools can be found here: https://github.com/secfigo/Awesome-Fuzzing#tools. Popular tools available for Java include EvoSuite [3] and Randoop [7] .
AFL
American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) is a security-oriented grey-box fuzzer that employs compile-time instrumentation and genetic algorithms to automatically discover test cases that trigger new internal states in C programs, improving the functional coverage for the fuzzed code [11] . AFL has been used to find notable vulnerabilities and other interesting bugs in many applications and has helped make countless non-security improvements to core tools. For example, AFL was instrumental in finding several of the Stagefright vulnerabilities in Android, the Shellshock related vulnerabilities CVE-2014-6277 and CVE-2014-6278, Denial-of-Service vulnerabilities in BIND (CVE-2015-5722 and CVE-2015-5477), as well as numerous bugs in (security-critical) applications and libraries such as OpenSSL, OpenSSH, GnuTLS, GnuPG, PHP, Apache, IJG jpeg, libjpeg-turbo and many more.
It supports programs written in C, C++, or Objective C, compiled with either GCC or Clang. On Linux, the optional QEMU mode allows black-box binaries to be fuzzed, too. There are variants and derivatives of AFL that allow fuzzing of Python, Go, Rust, OCaml, etc.-yet there is no support for Java programs. The only effort that we are aware of uses the GNU Compiler for Java (GCJ), a free compiler for the Java programming language, that was meant to compile Java source code to machine code for a number of CPU architectures. However, it is no longer maintained [4] . In this paper, we present Kelinci 1 , which addresses this gap. We demonstrate the effectiveness of the tool by applying it to the image processing library, Apache Commons Imaging, where it found a bug within one hour of analysis.
KELINCI
Inspired by the success of AFL we developed Kelinci, with the goal of applying AFL-style fuzzing to Java based applications. Kelinci provides an interface to execute AFL on Java programs. It adds AFLstyle instrumentation to Java programs and communicates results 1 Kelinci means rabbit in Indonesian, the language spoken on the Java island. back to a simple C program that interfaces with the AFL fuzzer. It does not require any modifications to AFL, but instead behaves exactly as a C program that was instrumented by one of AFL's compilers. The tool is available at https://github.com/isstac/kelinci. The overall design of Kelinci is depicted in Fig. 1 . The first step when applying the tool is to add AFL-style instrumentation to a Java program. AFL uses a 64 kB region of shared memory for communication with the target application. Each basic block is instrumented with code that increments a location in the shared memory bitmap corresponding to the branch made into this basic block.
The Java version of this instrumentation is the following: Mem.mem[id^Mem.prev_location]++; Mem.prev_location = id >> 1;
In this example, the Mem class is the Java representation of the shared memory and also holds the (shifted) id of the last program location. The id of a basic block is a compile-time random integer, where 0 ≤ id < 65536 (the size of the shared memory bitmap). The idea is that each jump from a block id1 to a block id2 is represented by a location in the bitmap id1 ⊕ id2. While obviously there may be multiple jumps mapping to the same bitmap location, or even multiple basic blocks which have the same id, such loss of precision is considered rare enough to be an acceptable trade-off for efficiency. The reason that the id of the previous location is shifted is that, otherwise, it would be impossible to distinguish a jump id1 → id2 from a jump id2 → id1. Also, tight loops would all map to the location 0, as id ⊕ id = 0 for any id.
Instrumentation is added to the program using the ASM bytecode manipulation framework [1] . Basic blocks are instrumented as described, the Mem class is added, as well as a TCP server component, which handles communication with the C side and execution of the target application on incoming files.
AFL expects two pieces of information from an instrumented application. First, the application should be running a fork server, which responds to requests from the fuzzer to fork the process and run the forked process on the provided input file. Second, the application is expected to connect to the shared memory and write to locations corresponding to branches in the program. The interface.c component implements a fork server that is identical to the one in programs instrumented by an AFL compiler. When a request to fork comes in, it creates a fork of itself that sends the provided file over to the Java side, receives the result (shared memory plus error status) once the run is done, writes results to shared memory and crashes if the Java program resulted in an exception escaping the main method.
For a given input file generated by the fuzzer, the interaction between the C and Java sides is as follows:
(1) interface.c receives a fork request from AFL. (2) One of the forked interface.c processes loads the provided input file, the other keeps running the fork server. (3) The former interface.c process sends the provided input file over a TCP connection to the Kelinci server. (4) The Kelinci server receives the incoming request and enqueues it. (5) The Kelinci server processes the request by writing the incoming input file to disk, starting a new thread in which the main method of the target application is called on the provided input and monitoring it. If the thread throws an exception that escapes main, it is considered a bug. If the thread does not terminate within a given time-out, it is considered a hang. (6) The Kelinci server communicates the results back to the C side. The shared memory bitmap is sent over the TCP connection, as well as the status (OK, ERROR or TIMEOUT). (7) On the C side, the received bitmap is written to shared memory. Depending on the received status, the program exits normally, aborts or keeps looping until AFL hits its time-out.
To use the tool, the user first runs the Instrumentor on the target application. Next, the user starts the Kelinci server in the instrumented program. Finally, the user executes AFL on interface.c. The fuzzer is unaware that it is actually analyzing a Java program.
EVALUATION
To evaluate Kelinci we ran it on a JPEG parser. We chose Apache Commons Imaging because it is written completely in Java and the Apache Commons libraries are well-known. The version we analyzed is release candidate 7 ("commons-imaging-1.0-RC7"). We compare this against a run of AFL on the djpeg utility that comes with the IJG jpeg library [12] .
The first notable observation is that the behavior of Kelinci on Apache Commons Imaging is similar to the behavior of AFL on djpeg: it quickly finds that if the first byte is 0xFF, new behavior is triggered. Using this second-generation test-case, Kelinci finds after approximately 20 minutes that if the next byte is 0xD8, many new behaviors are triggered. In fact, as AFL on djpeg also showed, the two bytes 0xFF 0xD8 that Kelinci finds are the correct markers for the start of a JPEG image. As inputs that cause previously unexplored program behaviors are prioritized by AFL, the fuzzer will get incrementally closer to valid JPEG inputs.
After running Kelinci on our case study for 32 minutes, it found a bug: the value of segment length bytes is not properly validated. Each JPEG segment starts with a two-byte unsigned integer specifying the segment size. As the specified size includes these two bytes, the program subtracts 2 from the size before it is used. It then attempts to allocate a buffer for the segment, which fails (with a NegativeArraySizeException) if the specified size is 0 or 1. If this exception is not properly caught by a (server) application using the library, a malicious user could cause a crash by sending a faulty JPEG 2 .
A snapshot of the AFL interface after running Kelinci on Apache Commons Imaging for 35 minutes, presenting the results obtained so far, is shown in Fig. 2 .
DISCUSSION
The design of the tool with a TCP connection and file IO adds overhead; furthermore running Java programs is much slower that running native programs. For example, on Apache Commons Imaging, Kelinci is approximately a factor 500 slower than AFL on C. Despite this, Kelinci is still useful in practice as evidenced by our findings which were obtained on a single machine. In addition, the autonomy of the tool-separating the fuzzer from the application being fuzzed-enables Kelinci to leverage a distributed infrastructure that would make it possible to perform scalable, parallel fuzzing; a powerful advantage of Kelinci. We intend to extend interface.c to connect to an array of servers, to enable this distributed approach.
Another limitation of Kelinci is that different runs are executed within the same Java Virtual Machine (JVM) in new threads. This assumes that the different runs are independent, i.e. they cannot influence each other. This is not true in general, as, for instance, different threads could access the same static locations. Even with only a single executor thread, static locations might not be properly reset. A more precise implementation would be to create a new JVM for each run, or to fork the entire JVM before starting the host program. Analogous to many design decisions in AFL, we take a best effort approach, where precision is traded against efficiency or, in this case, simplicity. 2 See https://issues.apache.org/jira/browse/IMAGING-203 for the bug report.
CONCLUSIONS
We have presented Kelinci, which, to the best of our knowledge, is the only currently viable option to apply AFL-style fuzzing to Java programs. It does not require modifications to the fuzzer, is highly parallelizable and has discovered a real bug in the popular image processing library, Apache Commons Imaging.
AFL has proved to be exceptionally successful at discovering security vulnerabilities. Compared to available tools for Java fuzzing, such as EvoSuite and Randoop, AFL operates at the system level while the other tools generate unit tests and is specifically targeted to security vulnerabilities. Kelinci opens up the possibility of testing Java based applications using this powerful technique.
Future Work. We intend to enable connecting the fuzzer side to an array of servers running Kelinci instrumented applications. This would enable running as many instances as desired in parallel in the cloud (the Java side can already accept requests from multiple fuzzer clients). It is expected that such parallelization creates a near-linear increase in performance.
We intend to use Kelinci as a platform for finding time/time vulnerabilities (notably Denial-of-Service). This research direction would comprise adding a cost dimension to AFL's logic for prioritizing inputs to fuzz, e.g., inputs that yield long computation times are more likely to be fuzzed.
Analogous to the work on Mayhem [2] and Driller [9] , we also intend to combine Kelinci with symbolic execution, using Symbolic PathFinder [8] .
